Economic Competition and Territorial Conflict
(with Mark Crescenzi)

In this book project, we explore how market structure and institutions shape international conflict behavior. Economic commerce and international institutions are generally viewed as factors that promote peace. However, in some situations these structures actually inhibit the ability of countries to reach peaceful settlements to disputes over territorial resources. Economic competition in imperfect markets can lead countries to pursue strategies of delay and military escalation in order to achieve greater market power. International institutions can help ameliorate the risks that come from economic competition, but they can also limit potential settlements at the bargaining table.

The Dynamics of Terrorist Organizations’ Shift into Politics
(with Menevis Cilizoglu and Chelsea Estancona)

Why do some terrorists organizations choose to form political wings? Why do some governments allow such parties to participate in the electoral process, while others ban them? In this paper, we tackle these questions by considering the strategic interaction between domestic terrorist organizations and their host governments over entering the conventional political arena.